For the Republic
← Command Center / 🎙 Episode / 2026-02-13 · ~12.5 minutes (~1,880 words)

The Sand Castle

Draft Complete — Pending Host Review

Fact Check

7/10
fact-check.md

Fact Check Report

Summary

The draft script is built on a solid factual foundation. The core data -- drawn from G. Elliott Morris's Strength In Numbers/Verasight January 2026 poll -- is accurately cited throughout. Most statistics, issue-by-issue breakdowns, and characterizations of analysts check out against both the source material and independent verification. However, there is one significant structural issue in the cold open that conflates two different voter populations measured in different ways, and several smaller items that need attention.

  • Red flags: 1
  • Yellow flags: 3
  • Blue flags: 3

Findings

Red Flags

"In 2024, Americans who consumed zero news... backed Donald Trump over Kamala Harris by twenty points. Sixty to forty. ... Today, that same group's approval of Trump has collapsed to 43 percent."

  • Location in script: Cold open, lines 10-12
  • Issue: The script presents these as the same group of voters, but they are not. The "60 to 40" statistic comes from a separate pre-election poll measuring Americans who consumed zero news. The "43 percent" approval figure comes from the January 2026 Strength In Numbers/Verasight poll measuring low-knowledge voters -- defined as people who could not correctly identify which party controls both the House and Senate. These are related but distinct populations measured by different instruments at different times. Morris himself presents them sequentially in his article to illustrate a broader pattern, but he does not claim they are the same group. The script's phrasing -- "that same group" -- directly asserts they are identical, which is factually inaccurate.
  • Evidence: The Morris article uses "zero news consumption" as a pre-election illustrative data point from an unnamed external poll, then transitions to his own poll's "low-knowledge" metric (congressional knowledge test) for all subsequent analysis. The 43% figure, the 11-point margin, the 25-point swing, and all issue-level data refer to the knowledge-test group, not the zero-news group.
  • Recommended fix: Restructure the cold open to avoid the "that same group" bridge. Option A: Open with the low-knowledge voter data (the 11-point margin to -13 swing), which is the actual dataset the episode is built on. Option B: Keep the zero-news stat as an attention-grabbing hook but explicitly note it comes from a different measure, then pivot to the knowledge-test data. Something like: "A different measure tells a similar story -- voters who couldn't identify which party controls Congress backed Trump by 11 points. Today, they disapprove of him by 13."

Yellow Flags

"White working-class voters started drifting right under Reagan"

  • Location in script: Counterargument section, line 64
  • Issue: The phrasing "started drifting right under Reagan" slightly misdates the beginning of the shift. The white working-class drift toward the GOP began in the late 1960s with Nixon's "silent majority" appeal and George Wallace's populist insurgency, not under Reagan. Reagan crystallized and accelerated the trend in 1980-1984, but it did not "start" with him. The script's own preceding sentence says the trend has been building "since the 1970s," which is closer to accurate -- the tension is between those two sentences. Data from the American National Election Studies shows the shift was already underway by 1976, with white non-college voters favoring Ford over Carter by a slim margin, reversing long-standing New Deal patterns.
  • Context: The script correctly says the trend has been building "for decades" and "since the 1970s." The issue is specifically with the word "started" in the phrase "started drifting right under Reagan." Changing "started" to "accelerated" or "crystallized" would be more accurate and consistent with the script's own timeline.
  • Recommended fix: Change "White working-class voters started drifting right under Reagan" to "White working-class voters began drifting right in the Nixon era, accelerated through Reagan..." or simply change "started" to "accelerated."

"Trump... held it in 2020"

  • Location in script: Line 56, discussing Trump's low-propensity voter coalition
  • Issue: The claim that Trump "held" his low-propensity voter coalition in 2020 is misleading. Research from Cambridge University's Political Science Research and Methods found that the greatly expanded 2020 electorate actually benefited Biden more than Trump. New voters and vote-switchers cast their ballots in favor of Biden, denying Trump reelection. While Trump did receive 12 million more votes in 2020 than in 2016 (indicating he did mobilize additional voters), the net effect of the expanded electorate worked against him. Saying he "held it" implies he retained his edge with these voters, which is at best a partial truth.
  • Context: Trump did turn out more low-propensity voters in 2020 than in 2016 in absolute numbers, so in one sense he "held" his mobilization capacity. But the expanded electorate as a whole favored Biden, so the net effect reversed. The script's argument would be better served by acknowledging this nuance.
  • Recommended fix: Consider "maintained his appeal to low-propensity voters in 2020 even as the expanded electorate swung against him" or simply "lost narrowly in 2020 despite strong low-propensity turnout."

"Congressional Democrats sit at 18 percent approval"

  • Location in script: Line 66, in the counterargument section
  • Issue: The 18% figure is accurate -- it comes from a Quinnipiac University poll conducted December 11-15, 2025 (published December 17, 2025). However, the script presents it without a date, and this figure may have shifted since December. More importantly, for context: the same poll showed Republican congressional approval at 35%, and despite the historic low approval for Democrats, voters in that same poll still preferred Democrats to win control of the House 47% to 43%. The figure is accurate but stripped of context that could change how the audience interprets it. The script is using the number to steelman the counterargument that Democrats have no credible alternative to offer, which is a fair editorial use, but the audience should know this is a specific snapshot.
  • Recommended fix: Minor. Consider adding "as of late 2025" or "in a December Quinnipiac poll" for sourcing precision. Not strictly necessary for a spoken script, but helps defensibility.

Verification Needed

"$100-a-month grocery increase... five percent of after-tax income" for someone making $35,000

  • Location in script: Line 44
  • Note: This math comes directly from the Morris article and is approximately correct. Someone earning $35,000/year with an effective federal tax rate of roughly 12% plus FICA (7.65%) would have after-tax income of approximately $28,100/year or $2,342/month. $100/$2,342 = 4.3%, and with state taxes it could approach 5%. The math is reasonable but depends on assumptions about tax rates and deductions. Morris presents it as an approximation ("~5%"), and the script drops the tilde. The host should be comfortable defending this as a rough estimate if challenged.

"He did win young men who'd never voted Republican before"

  • Location in script: Line 18
  • Note: Evidence supports that Trump made historic gains with young men in 2024 -- AP exit polling showed him winning 56% of young men, a dramatic flip from 2020 when 56% of young men voted for Biden. CIRCLE confirmed "this is the first time young men as a whole group, not just white men, in aggregate chose president-elect Trump by majority." However, the specific claim about "never voted Republican before" is an inference rather than a directly measured data point. The broad pattern is well-supported, but the host should be aware this is a characterization, not a citation.

"The MAGA movement's ability to mobilize these voters almost certainly doesn't transfer to Rubio, Vance, or anyone else"

  • Location in script: Line 86
  • Note: This claim is presented as analysis/prediction rather than fact, which is appropriate. It is supported by commentary in the Lawyers, Guns and Money blog source ("I'm also pretty skeptical that Trump's ability to get sporadic voters to the polls is going to transfer to Rubio or Vance"). Multiple analysts have expressed similar views. However, it has not been empirically tested. The "almost certainly" qualifier is strong for a prediction. The host should be comfortable that this is informed speculation, not established fact.

Sources Consulted

  1. G. Elliott Morris, "The less voters knew, the more they liked Trump in 2024. Not Anymore," Strength In Numbers / Substack, February 12, 2026 -- https://www.gelliottmorris.com/p/trump-lost-low-info-voters
  2. Quinnipiac University National Poll, December 17, 2025 (Congressional Democrats 18% approval) -- https://poll.qu.edu/poll-release?releaseid=3943
  3. The Hill, "Congressional Democrats' approval lowest since 2009" -- https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/5653760-congressional-democrats-approval-poll-midterms/
  4. CNN, "The ACA's enhanced subsidies have expired," December 18, 2025 -- https://www.cnn.com/2025/12/18/politics/aca-subsidies-cheap-plans-enrollment
  5. CNBC, "As enhanced ACA subsidies lapse, millions poised to drop health insurance," January 13, 2026 -- https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/13/enhanced-aca-subsidies-lapse-uninsured.html
  6. KFF, "How Much More Would People Pay if Enhanced Premium Tax Credits Expire?" -- https://www.kff.org/interactive/calculator-aca-enhanced-premium-tax-credit/
  7. Pew Research Center, "Voter turnout always drops off for midterm elections," July 2014 -- https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2014/07/24/voter-turnout-always-drops-off-for-midterm-elections-but-why/
  8. Pew Research Center, "Midterm voter turnout in 2022 declined from 2018 high," March 2023 -- https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/03/10/turnout-in-2022-house-midterms-declined-from-2018-high-final-official-returns-show/
  9. Ruy Teixeira profile, AEI -- https://www.aei.org/profile/ruy-teixeira/
  10. Sean Trende profile, RealClearPolitics -- https://www.realclearpolitics.com/authors/sean_trende/
  11. Patrick Ruffini, Party of the People (Simon & Schuster, 2023) -- https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Party-of-the-People/Patrick-Ruffini/9781982198626
  12. Fortune, "Trump gained more women, Hispanic and Black voters in 2024" -- https://fortune.com/2024/11/07/donald-trump-voters-2024-women-black-hispanic-white-men-americans/
  13. The Hill, "Trump won with major inroads among minority voters: Research" -- https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/5371852-pew-study-trump-diverse-coalition-voters/
  14. NPR, "Young men helped Trump retake the White House" -- https://www.npr.org/2024/11/12/nx-s1-5181804/young-men-helped-trump-retake-the-white-house-a-trend-years-in-the-making
  15. CIRCLE / Tufts, "The Youth Vote in 2024" -- https://circle.tufts.edu/2024-election
  16. SCOTUSblog, "When will we get the tariffs ruling?" -- https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/01/when-will-we-get-the-tariffs-ruling/
  17. Wikipedia, "Tariffs in the second Trump administration" -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tariffs_in_the_second_Trump_administration
  18. Cambridge University Press, "The fall of Trump: mobilization and vote switching in the 2020 presidential election" -- https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-science-research-and-methods/article/fall-of-trump-mobilization-and-vote-switching-in-the-2020-presidential-election/54A7D26C371AC3CE26AD78D866695A17
  19. University of Virginia Center for Politics / Sabato's Crystal Ball, "It's Not the Economy, Stupid: The Ideological Foundations of White Working Class Republicanism" -- https://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/its-not-the-economy-stupid-the-ideological-foundations-of-white-working-class-republicanism/
  20. Lawyers, Guns and Money Blog, "Just enough information voters" -- https://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2026/02/just-enough-information-voters
  21. The Bulwark, "How Democrats Can Crush the Midterms" -- https://www.thebulwark.com/p/how-democrats-can-crush-the-midterms-tariffs-economy-affordability-immigration-deportation-border-crime

Clean Claims

The following major factual claims in the script checked out and can be relied upon:

  • Low-knowledge voters (congressional knowledge test) backed Trump by 11 points in 2024; now disapprove by 13 points; a ~25-point swing. Accurately reflects the Morris/Verasight January 2026 poll.
  • 75% of 2024 voters correctly identified both chambers' controlling parties; 25% did not. Matches source.
  • Issue-by-issue approval nearly identical between groups on economy, trade, foreign policy, immigration, healthcare, government funding. Accurately reflects the source data (specific net approval numbers in the source: jobs/economy -19 vs -21, trade -19 vs -22, foreign policy -15 vs -18, immigration -9 vs -9, healthcare -30 vs -27, government funding -20 vs -21).
  • 40-point disapproval on prices among low-knowledge voters vs. 30-point among high-knowledge; 10-point gap is statistically significant. Matches source exactly.
  • 19% of low-knowledge voters report losing coverage or facing premium increases since ACA subsidy expiration, vs. 11% of high-knowledge voters. Matches source exactly. Enhanced ACA subsidies did expire at end of 2025, confirmed by multiple independent sources.
  • 58% of low-knowledge voters hold strong opinions vs. 74% of high-knowledge voters. Matches source (15% strongly approve + 43% strongly disapprove = 58%; 24% + 50% = 74%).
  • Trump expanded coalition with Black and Latino voters in 2024. Well-documented by Pew, AP VoteCast, and multiple analyses.
  • Ruy Teixeira is at AEI; Sean Trende is at RealClearPolitics; Patrick Ruffini has documented the working-class realignment. All confirmed. (Trende is also a nonresident fellow at AEI.)
  • Midterm turnout runs 15-20 points below presidential elections. Confirmed by Pew and University of Florida data. Average gap is ~15 points; specific cycles have shown 20+ point drops.
  • The Supreme Court might strike down Trump's broadest tariffs. Confirmed -- the IEEPA tariff case was argued in November 2025; multiple justices expressed skepticism; ruling expected but not yet issued as of February 2026.
  • The administration has shown willingness to quietly roll back tariffs. Confirmed -- multiple tariff rollbacks documented in late 2025 (China tariff reductions, consumer goods exemptions, furniture tariff delays).
  • The 60-40 stat for zero-news-consumption voters. Accurately reflects what Morris cites from a pre-election poll. The original source poll is not named by Morris, but the figure is consistent with NBC News pre-election polling showing large Trump margins among politically disengaged voters.